



N^o II.

THE

PLEBEIAN.



1801

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P L E B E I A N.

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*Considerations upon the Reports relating
to the PEERAGE continued; and
Remarks upon the Pamphlets that have
been writ for the supposed Bill.*

By a Member of the House of COMMONS.

*Quis enim jam non intelligat Artes
Patricias? * * * **

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Printed for S. POPPING at the Black Raven in Paternoster-
Row. 1719. (Price 6 d.)

Where Letters are taken in, directed for the Plebeian.

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
Qui enim jam non intelligat
Patriam? * * *

L O N D O N :

Printed for S. PEARSON at the Black Raven in Pall-mall.
Per. 1719. (Price 6d.)

Where Letters are taken in, directed for the Plebsian.

The Agitation for the Bill will do themselves, that no body would be so bold as to attack him; and consequently



Person who exhibited himself in the 21st of March 18, in this Advertisement. Some

Considerations upon the Reports relating to the PEERAGE, continu'd.

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Question, having been more fortunate than to myself, I have perus'd his Labours. The

THOSE who are not particularly acquainted with the Vocation of Pamphlet-Writing, have very much wonder'd that a Matter of so great Consequence, as the Affair of the PEERAGE, and espous'd by such Persons as are very well known to be its Patrons, cou'd have been so long a while upon the Stage, and no Champion appear for it: but others, who are more vers'd in this kind of Business, know, there cou'd not be wanting Persons enough to make their Court, by producing their Lucubrations on this Head. But as it is a Subject that will not very well bear debating, their Masters, without doubt, were of opinion, that the best way was, to let all manner of Writing alone, and keep all that cou'd be said on the Subject, for the Time and Place where it was absolutely necessary to say something.

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The Agitators for the Bill assur'd themselves, that no body wou'd be so bold as to attack first; and consequently judg'd themselves out of all danger. But the PLEBEIAN starting forth unexpectedly, they were forc'd, like People in a Surprise, or on an Invasion, to march immediately any Troops they had: and indeed, these are some of the most rattar'd I ever saw.

The first Champion that appear'd for this Bill, was a Person who exhibited himself in the *St. James's-Post* of Wednesday, March 18. in this Advertisement: *Some Considerations relating to the Peerage of Great Britain. Wherein the Arguments for the Reasonableness and Expediency of a Bill said to be depending, are stated Pro and Con.*

This Performance I have not been able to venture upon; for He that can state Arguments for the Bill, both *Pro* and *Con*, is too slippery a Person for any body to lay hold of.

The next that enter'd the Lists, on the same side of the Question, having been more fortunate than to discover himself beforehand, I have perus'd his Labours. The Account he gives of himself, is, "That he is a Member of the *House of Commons*, who has a Friend with whom he uses to talk over in private, all Arguments and Considerations which concern any thing of Moment, as far as they could collect and remember them: and they having both agreed, that this was a Matter of a very extraordinary Nature, the one entreated the other to put his Thoughts about it in Writing, that he might be better able to judge of them all together. And in order to continue the Privacy of this Correspondence, those Thoughts came out, printed for *J. Roberts in Warwick-Lane.*"

This notable Introduction was very near having the same effect upon me, as to this Pamphlet, as the Advertisement just mention'd had to the former; but with much ado I went thro the Performance. All I can learn from it, is, That this Gentleman was present at the Debates of the House

House of Lords: Where he does not seem to have been mightily enlighten'd as to the true state of the Case, the Debate having in all probability run pretty much one way. P. 8.

The next that follows these two Combatants for this Bill, is somebody or other that is us'd to Malquerading, as I suppose; and indeed he is so well disguis'd, that 'tis impossible to know him. When I first read the Title, *The Old Whig*, I expected no less than the utmost Wrath and Indignation against the House of Lords. I could not help thinking but he would have been for *Voting them useless* at least, as his Ancestors did formerly: but I was extremely surpriz'd to find just the contrary; that he is for giving them such a Power, as would soon make the *House of Commons useless*: and therefore he might as well have taken any other Title in the World, as *The Old Whig*. I am afraid he is so old a *Whig*, that he has quite forgot his Principles.

But I shall shew now more plainly, what is said in the former *PLEBEIAN*, that this is neither a *Whig* nor a *Tory* Point, but is a Jumble, a Hodge-podge, a Confusion of all Parties and all Persons together; and must inevitably in its Consequences destroy first *Whig* and *Tory*, and afterwards *Crown* and *People*. As all sorts of People unite for it, so ought all Sorts, and of every Denomination, that have any value for their Constitution, to unite against it.

This Pamphlet, by the Marks it appears with, being in all probability the best Performance that is to come from that Quarter, the *PLEBEIAN* will consider it thoroughly: and in order to proceed more methodically, for this Author's Satisfaction,

First, I will answer the Objections, made to the last *PLEBEIAN*. Secondly, I will consider the Argument, as the *Old Whig* states it himself.

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The first Objection the Author of the Remarks makes to the PLEBEIAN, is Pag. 12. where he says, "That the *Introduction*, the *Digression* upon the *Ephori*, and the *Conclusion*, are all Arguments *ad constandam invidiam*." He who says that Arguments drawn from History, which can only shew what has happen'd in former times, are Arguments *ad constandam invidiam*, gives up the Matter in dispute, and lets the World know, by passing them so slightly over, that he feels their force: for it is a tacit admission, that in all probability the like Disasters will happen from the Alterations now projected in our Constitution; which History informs us were the real Consequences of Alterations of the like nature in other Countries; otherwise those Arguments could not now contribute to make Persons invidious. Besides, I always thought that bringing Examples from History was look'd upon as the most impartial and unexceptionable Method of arguing, as it is abstracted from the Passions and Interests of the present Times: for what is the use of Learning and History, if it be not to draw Inferences of what may happen, from what has happen'd?

As to the Digression upon the *Ephori*, the PLEBEIAN was very careful to avoid giving Offence. Amongst the many extraordinary Powers exercis'd by those Magistrates, there was one of a very uncommon nature; which was, That as they took upon themselves the sole Inspection of the Youth, they were particularly curious of the Persons of the Boys. They employ'd every tenth Day in examining the Youths of about Fifteen, stark naked, *Opertabat Ephoris decimo quoque die Ephoris se sistere sine Vestis*, Ubbo Emmius de Re. La. p. 235. with whom Cragg agrees almost in the same words, in the Treatise mention'd in the former PLEBEIAN, p. 78. What an ill Use was made of this Power, we may see in Emmius, p. 236. where speaking of the manner the *Ephori* liv'd with those young Men they lik'd best, he says,

says, *lis* (Ephebis) *assiduo fere adharebant*. Which Words, for fear of offending the PLEBEIAN Ladies, I am not at liberty to translate. However, it is very plain all this was omitted to avoid the least Appearance of personal Reflection.

The first Argument of the PLEBEIAN, which the *Old Whig* objects to, is, p. 12. "That tho' the PLEBEIAN declares against the propos'd Bill, because it will make so great an Alteration in our Constitution, yet he produces an eminent Instance of a great Alteration of our Constitution in the Lower House under the Reign of Queen Elizabeth, when the Crown erected several new Corporations, and relieved several antient decay'd ones from sending any Members at all."

This, the Remarker says, was as great an Alteration in one Branch of our Legislature, as is now propos'd to be made in another. The Remarker quite mistakes this Point; for instead of being an Alteration of so great consequence to the Constitution of the Commons, as this new Proposal is of that of the Lords, it was an Alteration of no consequence at all. Suppose the Towns of *Watchet* and *Dunster*, two Sea-Ports in *Somersetshire*, to have been destroy'd in the Wars with *Ireland* in Queen Elizabeth's Time. The Inhabitants, on account of Poverty, apply to the Crown to be exempted from the Charge of paying four Members to represent them in Parliament. The Crown some time after grants Charters to two neighbouring Towns in flourishing Circumstances, and directs the Writs at a following Summons of a Parliament to be sent to *Tiverton* and *Honiton*, instead of *Watchet* and *Dunster*. Let any body judge if this Alteration can be of any consequence to the House of Commons. Here is nothing else but the Places chang'd; and four Members from *Tiverton* and *Honiton* are the same thing as four from *Watchet* and *Dunster*: But to state this

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Matter with Nicety, would require much more Labour and Time than I am able to allow it.

Another Argument, which the Remarker says the PLEBEIAN furnishes against himself, is, "That he owns the Prerogative has been retrench'd in several Instances; because without such Retrenchment the Power of it appear'd exorbitant and dangerous to the Commons." But these Retrenchments being now made, the Question at present is, Whether the Commons ought to go on stripping the Crown of every Jewel till it becomes less resplendent than a Doge of *Venice's* Coronet, or less comfortable than the Sword-Bearer's Cap of Maintenance; and, what is of the greatest Moment to the Commons, less able to protect them against the Power of a House of Lords, if ever their Lordships should be dispos'd to claim a larger Share of Authority than belongs to them.

As to the Complaint the Remarker makes, That the PLEBEIAN *applies to Mens Passions, and not their Reasons; and declaims instead of arguing.* What must be said in answer to this, is, That People must make use of what Arms they have. On the one Side it is evident there can be nothing but arguing and reasoning, and declaiming and exemplifying; but on the other, the PLEBEIAN is afraid there are more irresistible Arts of applying to the *Passions*, rather than to the *Reasons* of Men, or else he would not have one Minute's Pain for the Issue of this Question.

The Manner in which the Remarker states the PLEBEIAN'S Argument, relating to the *shutting up the Door of the House of Lords*, shews he either wilfully or ignorantly mistakes that part of the Controversy: "For, after having cited the Words of the PLEBEIAN, he asks, if it can be detrimental to the House of Lords, and at the same time throw into their Hands all the Places and Honours that the Crown can confer upon them? Will that Body of Men, which wou'd become mean and despicable, and
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“ offensive as a stagnated Pool, by the means of this Alteration, be rais’d by the same Means to be the most formidable and most honoured Part of the Constitution? Or would they be able, without numerous Recruits of Wealth, Learning, and Industry, to oppose any thing for the Good of the Community?” To this I answer, It will not be detrimental to them in point of Power, but will be detrimental on account of those Talents that ought to accompany Power; the want of which the Commons will feel in their Judicature, and in many more Particulars. They will be *offensive* to others, but not perceive it themselves; they will be *formidable*, but not *honour’d*. These are natural *Effects* that all *Exorbitant Power* produces. As to Wealth, they will take it, ’tis to be fear’d, where they can find it; and Learning and Industry will be as useless Baubles to their Lordships, as *Dangling Peerages* (as my Author describes them excellently well) are to Men of Sense amongst the Commons.

The next Objection of the *Old Whig* to the *PLEBEIAN*, is, “ That he avers the Uncertainty of the Extinction of Families will leave so little Opportunity for the Crown to reward Merit by *PATRICIAN* Honours, that it will be much the same thing as if the Crown were never to have any such Power at all.” *Whereas* (says he) *there will be two Titles extinct every Year, according to the Calculation generally received.*

By the *Calculation generally received*, I suppose the *Remarker* means the List publish’d by way of prelude to this Project. Whether it be true or false, if some Heralds know any thing of this Matter, would take more Time to examine into, than, I dare say, the Constitution it is intended to introduce wou’d subsist. But supposing, for Argument sake, that that Calculation is right, and that in one hundred and sixteen Years there have been one hundred and fifty four Extinctions, there will be found
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wanting seventy eight to make up his Number of two a Year : So that the Extinctions have not been during that Term quite so many as after the Rate of one Lord and a half per Annum. But besides this Error in Arithmetick, there is another Error of an odd Nature in this Computation; which, unless some Method is proposed to ascertain it, will reduce the Extinctions to fewer than even one a Year. And if so, those who expect to have their Services rewarded by Reversions so uncertainly computed, may have Time enough to try all their Patience, and at last find that instead of advancing themselves to Dignity, they have been forging their own Chains. In the Computations of the Titles extinct, all those are comprehended who have been extinguished by the Edge of the Law, for Treason, Rebellion, and other Capital Offences : and who, without the Spirit of Prophecy, can foretell what Vacancies may happen by such Means for the future? But if, in favour of this Scheme, it be admitted that in all probability there may be as many and as great Criminals hereafter in that Noble Body, as there have been for the Time past, is it not to be fear'd that the Path to Justice may be more difficult, after this narrowing the Way up to the House of Peers, than it has been formerly?

As to what the Remarker has objected to the Arguments of the PLEBEIAN, which prove, " That the Limitation of the Number of the Lords will run the Constitution into an Aristocracy ;" this Matter shall be fully considered presently, when I come to examine the Old Whig's State of the Case.

In a following Paragraph, where the Remarker takes notice of what the PLEBEIAN urges on the Side of the King and Commons, viz. " That an ill Minister might be screen'd against them both, if this Law should take place, by reason that in such Case he wou'd know exactly his Judges, (who might likewise be his Accomplices) and

to act with Impunity; the Remarker argues, That if this Bill does not pass, an innocent Minister cannot be secure, nor a guilty one punish'd, if the Crown should add to the House of Peers a sufficient Number of the Enemies of the one, or of the Friends of the other. In either of which Cases the utmost Iniquity must be suppos'd in the Crown, which, I confess, I cannot bring my self to do, and therefore my Argument remains entire. And it would grieve me to the Heart, if I could think there were any *innocent Ministers*, who ought to be imbolden'd by the Consciousness of their Integrity, and yet should have greater Apprehensions from honest Actions, than has been hitherto shown by Men of the most guilty Consciences, thro the many Ages that this Constitution has subsisted, without the Alteration now desir'd.

The Remarker thinks it wonderful how the PLEBEIAN cou'd advance, "That the Number of the House of Commons not being subject to an Increase, is the only Advantage that they enjoy distinct from the House of Lords;" and alledges, that *all their Lordships Privileges together are not equal to that one of commanding the Purse of the Community*. Were it true, that the Commons enjoy'd this Privilege of *commanding the Purse of the Community*, distinct from the House of Lords, they would be very easy as to the increasing, or diminishing, or fixing their Number, or as to any thing else that might belong to that noble Assembly. But, alas! this is not the Case; for their Lordships Concurrence is as necessary to a Money-Bill, as to any other Bill: nay, whether a Money-Bill may not originally take its Rise in their House, is a Point never yet clearly given up by their Lordships, if I am not very much misinform'd; and whether they may not be more inclinable to dispute this Matter, if ever their Door comes to be shut in the manner now propos'd, may deserve very curious Reflection.

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Thus having answer'd every Objection made to the former PLEBEIAN by the *Old Whig*, except such as will occur in considering this Argument, as he states it himself; I shall now proceed to that Point which I propos'd at first setting out.

I agree with our Author, "That the best kind of Government is that which is compos'd of these three Branches, the *Royal*, the *Noble*, and the *Plebeian*." This is at present our happy Constitution: "But then, says this Author, we have one Imperfection or Defect in it, which wants to be remedy'd, and that is, the Crown has too great a power over one Branch of this Constitution; namely, the *Noble*, in that the Crown can, whenever it pleases, add so many to their Number as to influence their Actions." And this Author likewise assures us, *pag. 4.* "That the Crown has power enough also to gain a House of Commons, of what Complexion it pleases." From whence I observe, First, That if it be a Fault in the Constitution, that the Crown has so great power over one Branch of the Constitution, the *Noble*, as this Author affirms, it is as great an Imperfection that the Crown has so great a power, as he also affirms it has, over the PLEBEIAN. And therefore this Author should have propos'd some Method to have remedy'd this Defect in the latter, as well as in the former Branch; or else that Perfection in the Constitution he seems to be desirous of, cannot be arriv'd at. He contends, that it is absolutely necessary the *Lords should be entirely independent of the Crown*: An impartial Friend to the *whole Body of the People*, and to sound Reason, would have said as much for the Commons; then these two Estates would have been upon a Level. But even by such an Alteration, which is the only equal one, our Constitution would not be mended, but made much worse; for if both Lords and Commons were as independent of the Crown as this Author desires the

the Lords may be, the unhappy Consequence that must ensue wou'd be, That if any Discord shou'd arise betwixt them, and each remain inflexibly resolv'd, here the Constitution wou'd certainly want a casting Power; and the only way of ending the Dispute must be like a *Potish Dyet, by getting up on horseback*. And therefore this Power now in the Crown, and which has been in it for so many Ages, is necessary for the Good of the whole Community, to prevent the greatest Confusion, which might otherwise arise from the Passions of Men.

The Crown once parted with this Power out of its hands to the Commons; and that Concession produc'd the Ruin of the Monarchy, and of the Peerage. If the Crown shou'd part with the Power now to the Lords, that it has over them, why may it not be very reasonably apprehended, that the same fatal Consequence may ensue to the King and the Commons?

If it be necessary, as it has been plainly shewn, that the Power now in the Crown should remain there, for the Good of the People in general; it is as necessary for the Defence and Advantage of the Crown it self. The Lords (by the Power the Crown has of adding to their Number) are a fluctuating uncertain Body. This is all that gives the Crown any Influence over them, and prevents Combinations, Cabals, and Factions against the Crown. But if the Door comes once to be shut, so that the Crown cannot make any considerable Addition to their Number in any Exigencies whatever, what a Door is open'd at the same time to form a Power superior to that of the Crown, and superior to all human Controul? Then they will become a fix'd certain Body: And should three or four ambitious bold Men combine together hereafter, of the greatest Families, and the greatest Estates, where wou'd the Difficulty be of getting a Majority of two hundred thirty five? And if once obtain'd, what Remedy cou'd be provided,

provided, in so desperate a Case? Whilst they act in the common Methods of Government, they would command all Favours; and shou'd they ever act in an arbitrary Manner, Necessity and Self-defence wou'd make the Union amongst them the stronger.

I will now examine what the Author of the *Old Whig* calls the *Great Point*, and which ought to carry the chief Weight with us in this Case; which is, "That the Alteration now propos'd will give such a mighty Power to the Bulk of the *English* Commons, as can never be counter-balance'd by the Body of the Nobility. Shou'd we suppose two hundred thirty five Peers possess'd one with another of 5000 *l. per Ann.* this wou'd amount to no more than 1,175,000 *l. per Ann.* And what is such a Property, and the Power arising out of it, compar'd with the Power arising out of the Property of those many Millions possess'd by the Commons?"

By this State of the Case, we are to suppose on the one hand a certain, limited, fix'd Hereditary Body, of two hundred thirty five Peers, enjoying great Privileges above the Commons, and possess'd of an annual Revenue amounting to 1,175,000 *l.* which they have entirely in their own power; and this Estate not so equally divided as 5000 *l. per Ann.* to every Individual, but to some the Command of 50000 *l.* a Year apiece, others not 500 *l.* a Year. On the other hand, you must suppose a Body of above twice the Number fluctuating, unfix'd, in the power of their Prince every Moment, at furthest not able to subsist above a few Years, and possess'd of not near half the Estate before mention'd; is it not too evident which of these two Bodies must destroy the other, if once this should come to be really the Case? The Lords are Principals, and act entirely for themselves: The Commoners are no farther Principals than as to the Estates they possess themselves. As our Author has stated this matter,

matter, in order to magnify the Power of the Wealth of the Commons, tho he is all along speaking of the aggregate Body, yet he wou'd insinuate as if they had as great Command over the universal Body of the People, as the Lords have over themselves. This is as much as to say, that the four Members of the City of *London* have as absolute Command over the Estates of all the Inhabitants of that great *Metropolis*, as any four Lords have over their Tenants. Indeed, if the Commons had a Power of laying Taxes upon the Estates of all those they represent, that wou'd be the same thing in this Case, provided they had it abstractedly from the Lords. But this Fallacy, which is often insinuated in this Pamphlet, has been already detected. The Commons have no more power over their Fellow-Subjects Estates than the Lords: They cannot lay any Tax without their Lordships Concurrence. And all that is peculiar to the Commons in this matter, is, That they have hitherto been allow'd to chuse what Tax they judg'd easiest for the People: But every Day's Experience shews us, that if the Lords differ in opinion from the Commons, their Power is at an end. The better to illustrate this *Great Point*, as our Author properly calls it; as he has computed the Value of the Wealth of the Body of Peers, I will take the liberty to compute the Value of the Wealth of the Body of the Commons. Supposing them to be worth, one with another, 800 *l. per Ann.* including personal Estates, which I am certain is not disparaging this, or any other House of Commons that has sat in a *British* Parliament; the annual Income of five hundred fifty eight Commoners will amount to 446,400 *l.* which is so insignificant a Sum, in proportion to the Value of the Property of the Lords, that I will beg leave to compute His Majesty's whole Civil List with the Property of the Commons; both Sums together making but one Million forty

six thousand four hundred Pounds, and there will still remain a Balance on their Lordships side of one hundred twenty eight thousand six hundred Pounds *per Annum*. Therefore if it is an *uncontested Maxim*, That Power follows Property, (p.7.) here is Power, here is Property; and let the Body that possesses both in such a degree be but once made so independent as is propos'd, would not the Crown, would not the Commons, be absolutely under the Dominion of the Lords, according to this Author's own way of Reasoning?

I am satisfy'd the Controversy is ended here: but I will suppose my Author not to have been mistaken so very grossly, and examine his Argument upon an Imagination, that the Property of the House of Commons was ten times superior to that of the Lords, whereas the Property of the Lords is near three times as much as theirs; yet even in this Case, the Lords would have the advantage of them; because an united constant Body of Men always acting for the same Interest and Grandeur, and pursuing a continued Scheme, must be an Over-match for so transitory a Body, and made up of Persons of such different Views and Interests as the House of Commons is. To bring an Example on this Head, let us imagine the Stock of the Bank of *England* to be of the Value of One Million, and the Stock or Cash of all the Bankers, Scriveners, Goldsmiths, and Dealers in Money throughout *London*, to be four times or eight times that Sum; is there any body who does not believe the Bank, incorporated and well compacted in all respects for its own private Interest, will not have a greater Power, greater Credit and Authority, than all those particular Proprietors of a much larger Capital, who cannot possibly be ever put into any Posture, so as to act with that weight for their Interest, as the Bank will do for itself in the Circumstances above-mention'd? The great Power of
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of all such fix'd Bodies is chiefly owing to this Circumstance, that two or three Persons always govern the rest; and it is as well the common Interest of the Society that they should be so governed, as the particular Interest of the Governors. In this their Strength chiefly consists; and for this reason five or six hundred Lords (if any body can be so wild as to suppose the Crown will ever increase their number to such a degree) will not be so terrible to the Crown or the People, as two hundred thirty-five, or any such fix'd number. For to suppose that the Majority of two hundred thirty-five Lords, were they so fix'd, would not be entirely directed and influenced by three or four amongst them of the greatest Wealth, Abilities and Resolution, is as absurd and improbable to common Reason and constant Experience, as any thing that can be thought of.

If it be allow'd then, as it certainly must be, that the Weight of so great Power, and of such disproportionable Property, may by this means come into a very few hands, what Havock may it not make of the Dignity of the Crown, and of the Liberty of the People?

Thus I have shewn the certain destructive Consequences of this Project, as stated by the PLEBEIAN, and even as stated by the *Old Whig* himself. I must confess, I do not believe that the Authors of this Scheme were apprehensive how far it would go; but since it is now so plain, that *he who runs may read*, I hope they themselves will desist from so desperate an Undertaking.

I cannot help observing, that his Majesty is treated with great Indignity by the Author before me, in several Passages of his Pamphlet. In one place, he says, *Whilst the Door of the House of Lords is always open, People of overflowing Fortunes may find no great difficulty in procuring an Entrance.*

Entrance. In another, he insinuates, that *there is another kind of Merit besides what arises from virtuous Actions, Learning, and Industry, that has been often rewarded with Peerage.* I am satisfy'd his Majesty has us'd this Prerogative, as he has done every other Prerogative of the Crown, with the greatest Discernment, and therefore I am willing to trust it still in his hands. The House of Lords is treated by this Author still more *en Cavalier* than his Majesty. His words are these: "If the *English* Commonalty should (by this "Bill) gain only this single Advantage, I think it a very "considerable one, That it will hinder the Nation from "being over-run with Lords. We know, that in the Sale "of an Estate it is no small Recommendation to the Buyer, "that there is no Lord within so many Miles of it; and "the distance of such a Borderer is often look'd upon as "an Equivalent to a Year's Purchase. But who can be secure from such a Neighbour, whilst the Species is so apt "to increase and multiply? I shall not insist upon paying "of Debts, which is look'd upon as a moral Duty amongst "Commoners, who cannot but be sorry to see any Additions to an Order of Men that are shelter'd by Privileges "from the Demands of their honest and industrious Creditors. To which many Considerations of the like nature "might be added, were they not obvious to the private "Reflection of every Reader."

I cannot very well account for it, how this Author comes to take so great a liberty as he has done here; even so far, as to endeavour to make it believ'd, that the Lords are shelter'd from their just Debts; whereas every one knows, a Lord's Goods and Effects are liable to the Pursuit of his Creditors, tho his Person is always protected. This Author and I differ on every account, as to what relates to this Branch of the Legislature. They seem to me to have

have been for many Years, and to be at present a just and honourable Body. This, I think, is owing to the Frame of that Body, and the Situation it is in. I am against altering either, for fear lest they should become Tyrannical and Odious. The *Old Whig* represents them to be at present a Species of such a nature, as I dare not venture to repeat, but must refer to his own words; and yet contends to vest them with much greater Powers than they now have.

I have but one Remark more to make upon this Author, which is indeed in a Matter of the last Consequence, and which cannot be thoroughly consider'd till the next Paper. The Author of the *Old Whig* has very truly stated the Power of the Crown, as it relates to the Legislature, in these words:

“The Crown, as a Branch of the Legislature, cannot desire a greater Prerogative, than that of a Negative in the passing of a Law: and as it ought not to influence either House in their Debates, what can a good King desire more, than the Power of approving or rejecting any such Bill as cannot pass into a Law without the Royal Assent?”

As I readily admit of all that is here advanc'd, That the Regal part of the Legislature is to wait for the Advice of its Great Council, both Houses of Parliament, and to give its Negative to what it does not approve; that doing otherwise, would be influencing the Debates of one or both Houses, and turning the Constitution quite upside-down: As I sincerely allow a good King cannot desire any more than the Approving or Rejecting any Bill offer'd him; and as I believe from the bottom of my Heart, that we never had so good a King as we have now: what Credit can I give to what this Author asserts, that *his Majesty has already*

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signify'd his Consent on this Point, of so great Consequence to Himself, and to the very Being of his FAITHFUL COMMONS, before he has so much as once heard their Opinion? Our Author calls this an Act of unparallel'd Goodness. But what I have to say upon this Subject, I shall reserve to another Opportunity, if what this Author seems to be assur'd of, should prove true.

F I N I S

